What constitutes right action from a virtue ethical perspective? Critics of virtue ethics claim, that as a theory, virtue ethics fails to give a proper account of right action. According to some critics, any attempt to provide virtue ethics with a proper understanding of what right action is, or what it would specifically entail, is doomed to fail. Many conclude that we ought not take Virtue ethical theorizing seriously since it cannot provide us with a palatable account of right action. I argue against these critics, claiming that there can be a formulation of right action within a virtue ethical framework that is distinctly different from traditional versions and in turn does not fall to the criticisms that are levied against it. After detailing my account, I apply it to the controversial action of aborting. The aim of this book is three-fold: First, to give a version of right action within a virtue ethical framework that circumvents the latest criticisms. Second, to apply this theory to cases of abortion. Lastly, to discuss blame and praise in the context of abortion.